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We identify a unique viewpoint on the collective behaviour of intelligent
agents. We first develop a highly general abstract model for the possible
future lives these agents may encounter as a result of their decisions. In the
context of these possibilities, we show that the causal entropic principle, whereby
agents follow behavioural rules that maximize their entropy over all paths
through the future, predicts many of the observed features of social interactions
among both human and animal groups. Our results indicate that agents are
often able to maximize their future path entropy by remaining cohesive as a
group and that this cohesion leads to collectively intelligent outcomes that
depend strongly on the distribution of the number of possible future paths.
We derive social interaction rules that are consistent with maximum entropy
group behaviour for both discrete and continuous decision spaces. Our analy-
sis further predicts that social interactions are likely to be fundamentally based
on Weber’s law of response to proportional stimuli, supporting many studies
that find a neurological basis for this stimulus–response mechanism and pro-
viding a novel basis for the common assumption of linearly additive ‘social
forces’ in simulation studies of collective behaviour.1. Introduction
Collective decision-making and the emergence of collective intelligence are key
areas of study in animal behaviour and social science. Since Francis Galton
observed the power of the central limit theorem to provide an accurate estimate
for the weight of a bull by averaging individual opinions (as told by James
Surowiecki [1]), the ability of groups to make decisions that improve on the
accuracy of the individuals comprising them has continued to surprise
researchers. Human [2], animal [3] and even algorithmic [4] groups have
been shown to improve on individual performance in estimation problems
(Galton’s bull example), navigation [5], identifying superior options [6] and pre-
diction tasks [7]. In an age of unprecedented global connectivity of individuals
through Web and mobile Internet technologies, the opportunity to understand
the origins of social behaviour is greater than ever before.
Much is already known about how the transfer of information by individ-
uals can lead to intelligent outcomes on the group level. Models of social
contagion [8–10], quorum decision-making [11–13], Bayesian social decision
rules [14,15] and information cascades [16,17] all provide a detailed theory
for how each agent in a group can acquire and use information from other indi-
viduals’ actions, and under what conditions this leads to improved or disrupted
decision-making.
However, when we face the challenge of understanding the collective
behaviour of the millions of connected individuals now on our planet, the
prospect of beginning that process at the level of a single individual decision
maker is daunting. Statistical mechanics, and particularly the principle of
maximum entropy [18], provides an expedient methodology for studying the
behaviour of large systems with many interacting elements. Harte and
co-workers [19,20] show how maximum entropy methods imply specific non-
trivial distributions of organisms in space and energy usage, which match
observed natural distributions and those predicted by more structured
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also be used to analyse snapshots of moving groups, inferring
effective interactions by assuming the snapshot of positions
and directions is sampled from a Boltzmann distribution
[23]. Such an approach assumes that the collective is in a
form of quasi-equilibrium. Extending the maximum entropy
concept, the principle of maximum entropy production
(reviewed by Niven [24]) has enabled these methods to be
applied to more-general flow systems outside of the classical
notion of equilibrium, and causal entropy [25] has been pro-
posed to extend this to the case where the individual
elements of the system exhibit intelligence.
A physical, mechanical approach has already provided a
fruitful route to understanding collective behaviour, in par-
ticular collective motion, via the abstraction of social forces:
pseudo-forces that can modify an agent’s energy depending
on its alignment with or proximity to other individuals
[26], or explicitly provide a physical force to alter the
agents’ motion [27,28]. Such approaches have been able to
demonstrate why human and animal groups undergo
phase transitions between quasi-equilibria analogous to
those seen in statistical–mechanical systems and have been
developed to a particularly high degree of sophistication in
the study of human crowds [29], where they are used to
understand disasters such as at Hillsborough (1989) and the
Love Parade (2010) [30]. However, social forces are a con-
venient abstraction of psychological choices, and therefore
are typically adjusted to fit observations, rather than being
based on the fundamental logic of interactions.
In this paper, we demonstrate a new way to understand
collective behaviour, from a purely entropic viewpoint, with-
out any a priori specification of social information transfer,
social forces or individual interaction rules. We do this by
building on the causal entropic (CE) framework of Wissner-
Gross & Freer [25]. By specifying our uncertainty about the
long-term futures of a group of agents, we will show that
the decisions this group makes now can be predicted. We
will further show that social rules of interaction and social
forces, as assumed in many studies of collective behaviour
in the form of conditional expectations for agents to make
specific choices based on their decisions of others, emerge
not from the adaptiveness of the agents’ choices, nor from
any consideration of their immediate needs or desires, but
simply from a tacit assumption that their long-term actions
are maximally uncertain.2. The causal entropic principle
The CE principle is an assertion about our knowledge of a sys-
tem’s future path through state space. This is fundamentally an
argument from a principle of maximum ignorance—we deem
ourselves to be as uncertain as possible about the path an
agent will take through all the future options available. As
we shall show, this counterintuitively provides us with infor-
mation about which choices the agent is likely to make now.
In previous work, Wissner-Gross & Freer [25] derived a ‘CE
force’ that drives systems towards locally available new micro-
states that permit a greater number of available paths through
future state space. In the cases presented by Wissner-Gross &
Freer [25], this force acts upon particles moving in a continu-
ous, bounded Euclidean space. As the ergodic principle for
equilibria states that any microstate of the particles in the gasis equally probable, so in a causal entropic system, all available
future paths are assigned an equal probability. Therefore, the
probability of any new reachable microstate being selected is
proportional to the number of future state-space paths that it
makes available. This CE force was shown to cause a diverse
range of systems to behave in apparently intelligent ways,
mimicking for example animal use of tools or complex
cooperation. Inspired by these examples, we consider whether
the same principle can predict the interactions between
individuals in groups that are the foundation of collective
cognition and intelligence.2.1. Application to collective decisions: a toy example
Consider observing a group of agents who must decide
between two options, A and B. Typically for social animals
(including humans) that live as groups, social interactions
between individuals will have an influence on which option
each agent chooses. This interaction is typically expressed
via the conditional probability for a focal agent to choose
option A, based on the number of other individuals who
have chosen either A or B, which we denote nA and nB:
P(AjnA, nB). From this conditional probability, the likelihood
P(nA) that a certain number of the agents will ultima-
tely choose option A can be derived by considering the
probability of all possible sequences of choices that lead to
that outcome.
We address this problem in reverse. We first derive the
group-level distribution P(nA), and ultimately use this to
infer an equivalent individual interaction rule P(AjnA, nB)
that satisfies this. We assume that at the macro-scale group
level, the distribution of future paths through state-space will
conform to the CE principle, and subsequently ask which
interactions between individuals would need to evolve to pro-
duce this maximum entropy distribution. Thus, we retain the
principle that the individual acts as the decision maker. Further-
more, we do not assign entropy-maximizing agency or will to
the individual agent or to the group; we ask instead what
interactions the maximum entropy distribution implies and
assess whether these correspond to interactions previously
observed in nature and in experiments.
In this example, we construct a hypothetical world where
the information about the future is the following: behind one
door lies four more options; behind the other, there is only
one. This is illustrated in figure 1. Assuming that the door
with four options is equally likely to be either A or B, what
distribution of the agents between the two options will maxi-
mize their expected entropy, over the possible future paths to
the final level of the branching tree?
For any given branching tree, entropy is maximized by
making any assignment of the agents to each future path
that reaches the final level equally probable. Because the
graph of choices is a tree, each final option is associated
with a single unique path through the future space; therefore,
it is equivalent to assign agents randomly to the final nodes
on the tree. We aim to find a consistent distribution of
agents that maximizes the path entropy over all possible
worlds—a general way for the agents to organize themselves
such that their entropy will be as high as possible, on average,
in all the worlds they might encounter. Therefore, we take
each possible tree, weighted by its probability of existing
and assign a uniform multinomial distribution of the agents
to its final nodes. We then feed this distribution back to the
.. .
BA
world 1: p = 1/ 2
world 2: p = 1/ 2
.. .
BA
Figure 1. Schematic of a toy example illustrating the CE collective model. A
group of agents at the root of the tree must choose between two options: ‘A’
and ‘B’. Two possible worlds exist: one where option A leads to four more
choices and B to one, or one where A leads to one more choice and B to
four. The decision rule for the group that maximizes their future path entropy
averaged over the two possible worlds is a mixture of two binomial distri-
butions, shown in figure 2.
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Figure 2. An example of predicted decisions by a group of eight agents in a
‘toy’ world: choosing one (unknown) option leads to four possible future
paths, and the other to one. A future path is assigned at random to each
agent, averaging over possible configurations of the future world, where
the four options may be behind choice A or B. The predicted distribution
of nA, the number of agents choosing door A, is a weighted sum of binomial
distributions, with far greater cohesion than expected if each agent would
independently choose a door at random.
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Denoting by N the total number of agents, and by nA and nB
the number choosing each door, this model implies that the
probability distribution for the number choosing door A is
a weighted sum of two binomial distributions, one with
p ¼ 4/5, the other with p ¼ 1/5. Each has a weight of 1/2,
as each has a 50% chance of existing:
P(nA) ¼ 12
N
nA
 
4
5
nA1
5
NnA
þ 1
2
N
nA
 
1
5
nA4
5
NnA
¼ 1
2
N
nA
 
4nA þ 4NnA
5N
: (2:1)
For the case of eight agents picking between these two
options, the expected distribution is shown in figure 2, along-
side the distribution we would expect if each agent chose a
door independently at random. The exact form of the distri-
bution varies with the total number of agents, as well as
with the number of future options. The figure clearly shows
that the CE principle, picking randomly from future options
rather than the immediately available ones, induces a greater
degree of cohesion on the agents—they are much more likely
to choose the same option. This cohesive ‘force’ increases as
the difference between the number of options behind each
door increases.3. Collective causal entropic model
We now expand the toy example above to consider more gen-
eral collective decisions, where the information about the
number of future options is less precise. Letting P(pA) and
P(pB) describe the probability of finding pA and pB future
paths behind doors A and B, respectively (assuming for
now that these are independent), equation (2.1) generalizesto an infinite sum of probability-weighted binomial
distributions.
P(nAjN) ¼
N
nA
  X1
pA¼0
X1
pB¼0
P(pA)P(pB)
pnAA p
NnA
B
(pA þ pB)N
¼ N
nA
 ð1
R¼0
P(R)RnA (1 R)NnA dR, (3:1)
where R ¼ (pA)/(pA þ pB). The key factor in equation (3.1)
that controls the number of agents nA choosing door A is
the ratio R, the proportion of future options that lie behind
door A. The problem of estimating the agents’ behaviour is
thus largely a problem of estimating P(R), the probability of
this ratio.3.1. A distribution for the number of possible futures
In general, the number of future paths that either A or B may
lead to may take any distribution. However, for the purposes
of deriving the consequences of a model of collective
decision-making, we must determine a specific form for
P(pA) and P(pB), and most importantly for P(R). We propose
the following method: a continuing branching tree of possible
choices, in which each branch leads to an unknown number
of future choices (illustrated in figure 3). The number of
new choices generated on each branch is determined by
some fixed distribution, independent of time. This is a
Galton–Watson (GW) process [31]. We stress that the
agents themselves need not hold any beliefs about these
future choices. Instead, we argue that agents will develop
interaction rules that serve to maximize entropy over these
possible trees of future choices.
We are interested in the number of nodes on this branch-
ing tree after some time window h—the height of the tree.
The Kesten–Stigum theorem [32] states that for any GW
process, the distribution on the number of nodes converges
to an exponential distribution, conditional on the tree not
. . .
BA
Figure 3. Schematic illustrating the general branching process of future
choices. Each choice leads to an unknown number of future options to
choose between, creating an expanding tree of possible future paths.
The number of new options is generated from a stationary probability dis-
tribution, such that each new branch forms an independent and identically
distributed tree. The total number of options at the top of the tree, p, is
distributed according to a GW process. If the probability of generating no
new choices is non-zero, dead-ends can form (black circle) and there is a
probability a that the tree will become extinct. The CE collective model
assumes that agents will be uniformly distributed on the final options
(red circles), weighted by the probability of the tree being generated by
a GW process.
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tion, for large h, the number of options is distributed as
P(p) ≃ ad(0)þ (1 a) 1
zh
exp  p
zh
 
, (3:2)
where z is the mean number of descendants of each node in
each generation, a is the extinction probability and d is the
Dirac delta function. The extinction probability is determined
by the fixed point of the generating function for the number
of new choices generated on each branching. We will treat a
as an adjustable parameter of our model. The behaviour of
agents on this tree is determined, via equation (3.1), by the
ratio distribution P(R) ¼ P((pA)/(pA þ pB)). Since our
assumption is that each new branch of the tree forms an inde-
pendent GW process, this takes a simple form
P(R) ¼ 1
1þ a ((1 a)þ a(d(0)þ d(1))): (3:3)
This follows from noting that the ratio X/(X þ Y ) of two
identically distributed exponential random variables X and
Y is a uniformly distributed random variable on (0, 1), and
considering the special cases where either pA or pB is zero.
Instances where both pA and pB are zero are undefined
and do not contribute to the calculation. The Dirac delta func-
tions are the result of the possible extinction of one branch or
the other. The final distribution over the choices of N agents
can be obtained via equation (3.1) and mirrors the distri-
bution of R, with an equal probability of 1 to N – 1 agents
choosing door A, and higher probabilities for either 0 or N
agents to do so if a. 0. An equivalent model exists for a
tree embedded in continuous time: the Yule process [33,34].
Thus the distribution derived for P(R) does not depend on
whether the branching process for possible future trees is dis-
crete or continuous in time.3.2. More than two choices
The same principles used to derive the distribution of the
agents over two choices can be applied to an arbitrarily
higher number of options. To do so, we need the following
fact: the proportional ratios of i.i.d. exponential random vari-
ables X1,X2, . . . ,XK are beta distributed. Using this fact and
accounting for the probability that one or more of the trees
behind each option goes extinct, we may generalize equation
(3.3). We have the following probability distribution for R, the
proportion of future paths behind one choice, in the case
where there are K options:
P(R) ¼ 1
1 aN
"
a(1 aN1)d(0)þ aN1(1 a)d(1)
þ (1 a)
XN1
i¼1
N  1
i
 
aN1i(1 a)i b(R, 1, i)
#
,
(3:4)
where b(R; a, b) represents the beta probability distribution on
R with parameters a and b. As a becomes large, the factors
multiplying the beta probability distributions tend to zero
faster than the delta function terms, and consensus is still
enforced. Each door shares an equal probability of being
the consensus choice, reflected in the greater chance that
R ¼ 0 than R ¼ 1. This result mirrors the experimentally
observed tendency of, for example, fish to remain as a
group when presented with three options [35], though it
should be noted that this framework does not provide a
clear way to model groups with conflicting preferences—a
limitation addressed in the discussion. For all but the
highest values of a, the probability of a consensus decreases
with the number of options K, implying the common-sense
notion that the probability of all agents choosing the same
option is reduced as the number of equivalent choices
becomes very high.4. Consequences
4.1. Consensus decision-making
The CE model predicts a tendency for groups of agents to
reach a consensus. In the case where the extinction prob-
ability is greater than zero, there is a strong entropic
‘bonus’ for agents to remain as a single group, specified by
the Dirac delta functions in equations (3.3) and (3.4). How-
ever, even in the case where the probability of all but one
future tree becoming extinct is effectively zero, such as
when a is zero or very small, or when the number of choices
is very high, there is still a strong bias towards consensus
decisions. For example, in the case that a ¼ 0, in figure 4
we plot the probability that a group of agents of size 2, 3 or
4 will choose the same option from K independent choices,
compared to the probability of this occurring if each agent
makes a choice uniformly at random.
4.2. Social interaction rules
The entropic prediction of collective consensus is fundamen-
tally a group-level analysis. Most studies in collective
decision-making have started from a model of how individ-
uals react to the decisions of others. What individual
interaction rules would be necessary to produce the group-
level behaviour that our analysis predicts? We can answer
this question by considering a single individual choosing
0 2 4
no. options, K
6 8 10
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P C
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Figure 4. The ratio of the probability that a group of N agents make the
same choice from K options within the CE model, relative to random
chance. Note the log scale on the y-axis. The ratio is always above one
for K . 1 and increases with both K and N, indicating the CE model’s
bias towards consensus collective decision-making.
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Figure 5. The increasing proportion of agents avoiding a threat with a low
detection probability (d ¼ 0.1) as a function of group size, for different
values of the extinction probability on the future paths tree. The greater
the possibility of one or other of the future path trees becoming extinct,
the greater the cohesive force between the agents, and thus the stronger
the information transfer between the detecting agents and the others,
resulting in improved collective intelligence.
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already decided. From equation (3.1), assuming that nA and nB
agents have already assigned themselves to options A and B:
P(AjnA, nB) ¼
Ð 1
R¼0 P(R)R
nAþ1(1 R)nB dRÐ 1
R¼0 P(R)R
nA (1 R)nB dR
: (4:1)
If the extinction probability is zero (a ¼ 0), implying that
P(R) ¼ 1, this can be simplified in form to reveal a Weber’s
law interaction [36]:
P(AjnA, nB) ¼
Ð 1
R¼0 R
nAþ1(1 R)nB dRÐ 1
R¼0 R
nA (1 R)nB dR
¼ b(nA þ 2, nB þ 1)
b(nA þ 1, nB þ 1)
¼ nA þ 1
nA þ nB þ 2 ,
(4:2)
where b is the beta function. This is Weber’s law with one
‘pseudo-observation’ for both A and B, and also corresponds
to the expected value of a Bernoulli probability after observing
nA successes and nB failures, assuming a uniform prior.
In the case where a. 0, there exists a special case when
either nA or nB is equal to zero. For example, if nA . 0 and
nB ¼ 0 then
P(AjnA . 0, nB ¼ 0) ¼ (1 a)b(nA þ 2, 1)þ a(1 a)b(nA þ 1, 1)þ a : (4:3)
In this special case, a! 1 enforces the same consensus as
derived at the group level, since the first agent to commit
to option A or B makes the probability of that option for sub-
sequent agents approximately equal to one, thus causing an
irreversible information cascade.4.3. Collective intelligence
The entropic enforcement of consensus decisions implies
some degree of collective intelligence. To see this, consider
the model used by Ward et al. [37] to explain the collectivedecisions of groups of varying size. In this ‘many-eyes’
model, if any one agent in a group spots a threat, all agents
will avoid it. This implies that the proportion of agents avoid-
ing a threat should grow in proportion to the probability that
at least one will spot the threat, i.e. 12 0.5(12 d )N, where d is
the detection probability.
Our model implies a similar result. As the agents them-
selves are not actively trying to maximize entropy (instead,
social decision rules have evolved that tend to maximize
entropy in general), any agent seeing a threat should avoid
it. However, once this occurs, the general tendency of the
other agents to maintain a consensus means that the group
will generally stick together, with a probability determined
by the extinction probability of the branching process, closely
mimicking the many-eyes model. We can calculate the
expected number of agents avoiding a threat as a function
of the extinction probability, by conditioning equation (3.1)
on a given number, i, detecting the threat and avoiding it,
and weighting by the probability of that number of detec-
tions, given d.
P(nA avoidthreat)¼
XnA
i¼0
N
i
 
di(1d)Ni

 Ni
nAi
 Ð 1
R¼0P(R)R
nAi(1R)NnAidRÐ 1
R¼0P(R)R
idR
#
:
(4:4)
In figure 5, we plot the implied collective intelligence for differ-
ent values of the extinction probability, in the case where any
given agent has a d¼ 0.1 chance of detecting a hidden threat,
as in the example of Ward et al. [37]. The prediction for high
values of a is essentially identical to the prediction of Ward
et al. [37]. When a is high, consensus is entirely enforced
since equation (3.3) tends to the sum of two delta functions.
This implies that one agent that spots and avoids the predator
is sufficient to cause all group members to avoid it, matching
the assumption made by Ward et al. [37].
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Set in a discrete space, the model we describe here does not
give immediate quantitative predictions about the types of
collective motion [38] we would expect in a continuous
space. However, we can sketch what such a generalized
model would look like. The choice of which direction to
move in is a decision like any other, but with many possible
options. According to the arguments above, agents in
approximately the same spatial location—those who will
experience the same branching process of future options—
should tend to move in the same direction.
For a given type of agent and environment, there is likely
to be a typical spatial range over which future option trees are
strongly correlated. We can associate this with the zones of
interaction found in many models of collective motion, such
as the classic Vicsek model [26] and Couzin zonal model
[27]. In the case of a relatively confined environment, individ-
uals outside of the immediate perceptual range may still
experience the same future trees, and this can be expressed
in individual interaction terms via a memory of encounters
[39], leading to something akin to a mean-field model.
We can discuss the form of interaction rules with refer-
ence to a quantitative special case. Assume that in a
continuous space, there are N þ 1 agents, of which N are
already committed to a particular position. Where should
the (N þ 1)th agent position itself? Let Ri ¼ pi/
P
jpj be the
ratio of number of future options at xi to the number available
at all other points fxjg. At each point xi in the space-direction
continuum occupied by an agent in f1, . . . ,Ng, there is a
probability distribution over this ratio P(Rijxi), where Ri are
assumed to be i.i.d. unless two points share the same future
tree. Let us further assume a particular form for the distri-
bution P(RNþ1jxNþ1): with probability gk, this position
shares a future tree with position xk. We take this probability
to be defined by a squared exponential decay function
gk ¼ exp (L1(xNþ1  xk)2): (4:5)
The probability distribution of possible position choices nNþ1 is
determined by a mixture of the possibility that P(RNþ1jxNþ1)
is independent of all other points, and each of the possibilities
that xNþ1 shares a future tree with the position of another
agent. Again ignoring second-order effects, we have
P(xNþ1) ≃ 1
X
k
gk
 !Y
i
kRlþ
XN
k¼1
gkkR
2l
Y
i=k
kRl
¼ mNþ1 þ
XN
k¼1
gkm
N1s2, (4:6)
wherem ¼ kRl ands2 ¼ kR2l m2.We find the optimal position
by maximizing P(xNþ1), obtaining
d
dxNþ1
XN
k¼1
exp (L1(xNþ1  xk)2) ¼ 0, (4:7)
which we identify as the least-squares solution: xNþ1 ¼
1=N
PN
k¼1 xk. Therefore, the unique optimal position for agent
Nþ1 is the mean position of all the other agents, implying a
social force towards this point proportional to dP(xNþ1)/
dxNþ1. It should be clear that the same argument would apply
in relation to the direction choices of other individuals as well,
creating an equivalent social force to rotate the agent’s direction
towards the average of the group. If the probability of sharingfuture trees were correlated between space and direction, then
a distance-dependent alignment force would emerge.5. Discussion
We have demonstrated that the CE principle gives a purely
statistical prediction for many of the emergent properties of
collective behaviour, without any detailed understanding on
the mechanisms of interactions between individuals. Com-
pared to previous work applying maximum entropy
methods in behavioural ecology (e.g. [20,23]), our approach
differs by focusing on dynamical processes rather than static
snapshots or equilibrium distributions. As such we measured
entropy over paths through state space, following Wissner-
Gross & Freer [25], rather than entropy over current positions
and velocities. Adopting the taxonomy of modelling
approaches described by Sumpter et al. [40], this is a purely
global approach to modelling groups and is complementary
to a detailed understanding of individual behaviour, rather
than a replacement. On the individual level, selection favours
those who make decisions which aid their survival and repro-
duction. This is entirely consistent with the idea that the group
operates with some degree of consensus, as following the
decisions of other group members is often individually
rational [14–16]. Our claim is that the resulting collective be-
haviour can be understood in part from a group-level
entropic view without a detailed understanding of how or
why individuals interact by considering the probability
distribution of all possible futures for the group.
Our model takes a unique approach to understanding the
origins of collective behaviour and makes testable predictions
about the fundamental form of social interactions. It predicts
that interactions between individuals take the form of
Weber’s law. This social decision rule has empirical support
in the response to various stimuli of several species, e.g.
insects [41,42], fish [15] and humans [10,43], as well as a
solid grounding in experimental psychology [44] and the psy-
chophysical [45] and neurological [46] basis of estimating
differences. In continuous spaces, we have shown that
reasonable assumptions about the spatial and directional cor-
relations between individuals’ futures lead to social forces
resembling those of self-propelled particle models, which
have also found experimental support [47–49], and which
underlie static maximum entropy approaches to collective
self-organization [23]. As our model can be shown to be
equivalent to Weber’s law interactions and social forces,
data supporting these form of interaction would equally
support our construction in an empirical test.
However, there are other studies that find that individual
decisions are better described by more nonlinear interactions
[11,12]. As pointed out by Bialek et al. [23], the fact that a maxi-
mum entropy method makes minimal assumptions does not
necessarily make it correct. Instead, this should be seen as a
basis model for social behaviour, implying that Weber’s law
can be considered the most basic form for social interactions.
However, observations of apparent nonlinear interactions do
not necessarily imply a fundamentally different mechanism.
Perna et al. [42] have shown that an accumulation of Weber’s
law interactions, combined with some degree of noise or inac-
curacy (which we would expect in any real system) can lead to
apparently nonlinear interactions. We therefore suggest that
where nonlinear interactions are observed, these may be the
rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org
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7
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which self-propelled particle models have shown can lead to
strongly nonlinear consensus decision-making in moving
groups [50,51]. In many experimental set-ups involving
animal groups, the choices ultimately made by the individuals
are not single events, but the final result of a period of motion
where many smaller choices are made, supporting the idea
that the final choice can be seen as an accumulation of smaller
interactions.
A limitation of our model is the lack of a description of
groups with conflicting information or preferences. Variation
in information or personality in groups has been shown to be
a potentially important driver of collective outcomes
[50,52,53]. This could potentially be addressed by assigning
different beliefs to each agent about the probability distri-
bution on future trees. However, we have deliberately
framed our model in terms of a consistent rule that produces
a maximum entropy result over all possible futures, rather
than assigning entropy-maximizing agency to the individuals
themselves. There is no clear reason for individual agents,
animal or human, to desire greater entropy over future
paths; rather, we consider it as a minimal assumption regard-
ing our certainty in which futures may be possible, and
which decisions the agents will take. Nonetheless, the view-
point could be relaxed to allow the emergence of a more
sophisticated model including conflicting groups in the
future. The entropic consequences of conflict are therefore
an area of importance for future research in this area.The model described here gives a simple caricature of the
types of decisions that face groups of intelligent agents. This
abstraction is useful for understanding the logic of how CE
maximization implies group behaviours, social interactions
and collective intelligence. We have shown how the model
might be generalized to a continuous space in consideration
of collective motion. Such an expansion of the model could
potentially describe the structure of moving animal groups
[23,54,55] and patterns of group-level direction changes
[56]. More widely, the CE principle may provide a general
framework for understanding the dynamics of complex intel-
ligent systems, extending from animal groups, through
organizations such as corporations and governments, to
global human social systems built on the enormous connec-
tivity of the Internet. We cannot be sure what series of
choices every animal, pedestrian, bureaucrat or social-net-
work user will face, or what decisions they will make, over
an extended period of time. But precisely this ignorance can
help us to predict what they will do next.Acknowledgements. We thank Seth Frey and one anonymous referee,
whose reviews substantially improved this manuscript.
Funding statement. R.P.M. was supported by ERC Starting grant
‘IDCAB’ reference no. 220/104702003 to David J. T. Sumpter and
ERC Advanced Investigator Grant ‘Momentum’ reference no.
324247 to Dirk Helbing. R.G. was supported by the German Science
Foundation (DFG) under the reference no. GA 1615/1-1.References1. Surowiecki J. 2005 The wisdom of crowds. New York,
NY: Random House LLC.
2. Woolley AW, Chabris CF, Pentland A, Hashmi N,
Malone TW. 2010 Evidence for a collective
intelligence factor in the performance of human
groups. Science 330, 686–688. (doi:10.1126/
science.1193147)
3. Sumpter D. 2010 Collective animal behavior.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
4. Rokach L. 2010 Ensemble-based classifiers. Artif. Intell.
Rev. 33, 1–9. (doi:10.1007/s10462-009-9124-7)
5. Simons AM. 2004 Many wrongs: the advantage of
group navigation. Trends Ecol. Evol. 19, 453–455.
(doi:10.1016/j.tree.2004.07.001)
6. Seeley TD. 2010 Honeybee democracy. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
7. Wolfers J, Zitzewitz E. 2006 Prediction markets in
theory and practice, Working Paper 12083. Cambridge,
MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
8. Salganik M, Dodds P, Watts D. 2006 Experimental
study of inequality and unpredictability in an
artificial cultural market. Science 311, 854–856.
(doi:10.1126/science.1121066)
9. Hedstrom P, Liu K-Y, Nordvik MK. 2008 Interaction
domains and suicide: a population-based panel
study of suicides in Stockholm, 1991–1999. Soc.
Forces 87, 713–740. (doi:10.1353/sof.0.0130)
10. Mann RP, Faria J, Sumpter DJT, Krause J. 2013 The
dynamics of audience applause. J. R. Soc. Interface
10, 20130466. (doi:10.1098/rsif.2013.0466)11. Sumpter D, Krause J, James R, Couzin I, Ward A.
2008 Consensus decision making by fish. Curr. Biol.
18, 1773–1777. (doi:10.1016/j.cub.2008.09.064)
12. Ward AJW, Sumpter DJT, Couzin ID, Hart PJB, Krause
J. 2008 Quorum decision-making facilitates
information transfer in fish shoals. Proc. Natl Acad.
Sci. USA 105, 6948–6953. (doi:10.1073/pnas.
0710344105)
13. Ward A, Krause J, Sumpter D. 2012 Quorum
decision-making in foraging fish shoals. PLoS ONE 7,
e32411. (doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032411)
14. Pe´rez-Escudero A, De Polavieja G. 2011 Collective
animal behavior from bayesian estimation and
probability matching. PLoS Comput. Biol. 7,
e1002282. (doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002282)
15. Arganda S, Pe´rez-Escudero A, De Polavieja G. 2012
A common rule for decision making in animal
collectives across species. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci.
USA 109, 20 508–20 513. (doi:10.1073/pnas.
1210664109)
16. Easley D, Kleinberg J. 2010 Networks, crowds,
and markets: reasoning about a highly
connected world. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
17. Mann RP, Herbert-Read JE, Ma Q, Jordan LA,
Sumpter DJ, Ward AJW. 2013 A model comparison
reveals dynamic social information drives the
movements of humbug damselfish (Dascyllus
aruanus). J. R. Soc. Interface 11, 20130794. (doi:10.
1098/rsif.2013.0794)18. Jaynes ET. 1957 Information theory and statistical
mechanics. Phys. Rev. 106, 620–630. (doi:10.1103/
PhysRev.106.620)
19. Harte J, Zillio T, Conlisk E, Smith A. 2008 Maximum
entropy and the state-variable approach to
macroecology. Ecology 89, 2700–2711. (doi:10.
1890/07-1369.1)
20. Harte J. 2011 Maximum entropy and ecology:
a theory of abundance, distribution, and energetics.
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
21. Niwa H-S. 2003 Power-law versus exponential
distributions of animal group sizes. J. Theor. Biol.
224, 451–457. (doi:10.1016/S0022-5193(03)
00192-9)
22. Ma Q, Johansson A, Sumpter DJ. 2011 A first
principles derivation of animal group size
distributions. J. Theor. Biol. 283, 35–43. (doi:10.
1016/j.jtbi.2011.04.031)
23. Bialek W, Cavagna A, Giardina I, Mora T, Silvestri E,
Viale M, Walczak AM. 2012 Statistical mechanics
for natural flocks of birds. Proc. Natl Acad.
Sci. USA 109, 4786–4791. (doi:10.1073/pnas.
1118633109)
24. Niven RK. 2009 Steady state of a dissipative flow-
controlled system and the maximum entropy
production principle. Phys. Rev. E 80, 021113.
(doi:10.1103/PhysRevE.80.021113)
25. Wissner-Gross A, Freer C. 2013 Causal entropic
forces. Phys. Rev. Lett. 110, 168702. (doi:10.1103/
PhysRevLett.110.168702)
rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org
J.R.Soc.Interface
12:20150037
8
 on October 8, 2015http://rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from 26. Vicsek T, Cziro´k A, Ben-Jacob E, Cohen I, Shochet O.
1995 Novel type of phase transition in a system of
self-driven particles. Phys. Rev. Lett. 75, 1226–
1229. (doi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.75.1226)
27. Couzin ID, Krause J, James R, Ruxton GD, Franks NR.
2002 Collective memory and spatial sorting in
animal groups. J. Theor. Biol. 218, 1–11. (doi:10.
1006/jtbi.2002.3065)
28. Helbing D, Molnar P. 1995 Social force model for
pedestrian dynamics. Phys. Rev. E 51, 4282–4286.
(doi:10.1103/PhysRevE.51.4282)
29. Helbing D, Johansson A. 2009 Pedestrian, crowd
and evacuation dynamics. In Encyclopedia of
Complexity and Systems Science (ed. R Meyers).
Heidelberg, Germany: Springer.
30. Helbing D, Mukerji P. 2012 Crowd disasters as
systemic failures: analysis of the Love
Parade disaster. EPJ Data Sci. 1, 7. (doi:10.1140/
epjds7)
31. Watson HW, Galton F. 1875 On the probability of
the extinction of families. J. Anthropol. Inst. Great
Britain Ireland 4, 138. (doi:10.2307/2841222)
32. Kesten H, Stigum BP. 1966 A limit theorem for
multidimensional Galton–Watson processes. Ann.
Math. Stat. 37, 1211–1223. (doi:10.1214/aoms/
1177699266)
33. Yule GU. 1925 A mathematical theory of evolution,
based on the conclusions of Dr. J. C. Willis, F.R.S.
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B 213, 21–87. (doi:10.
1098/rstb.1925.0002)
34. Simon HA. 1955 On a class of skew distribution
functions. Biometrika 42, 425–440. (doi:10.1093/
biomet/42.3-4.425)
35. Miller N, Garnier S, Hartnett AT, Couzin ID. 2013
Both information and social cohesion determine
collective decisions in animal groups. Proc. Natl
Acad. Sci. USA 110, 5263–5268. (doi:10.1073/pnas.
1217513110)
36. Weber EH. 1834 De Pulsu, resorptione, auditu et
tactu: Annotationes anatomicae et physiologicae. . ..
Leipzig, Germany: CF Koehler.37. Ward A, Herbert-Read J, Sumpter D, Krause J. 2011
Fast and accurate decisions through collective
vigilance in fish shoals. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA
108, 2312–2315. (doi:10.1073/pnas.1007102108)
38. Vicsek T, Zafeiris A. 2012 Collective motion. Phys. Rep.
517, 71–140. (doi:10.1016/j.physrep.2012.03.004)
39. Mann RP, Perna A, Garnett R, Herbert-Read JE,
Sumpter DJT, Ward AJW. 2013 Multi-scale inference
of interaction rules in animal groups using Bayesian
model selection. PLoS Comput. Biol. 9, e1002961.
(doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002961)
40. Sumpter DJT, Mann RP, Perna A. 2012 The modelling
cycle for collective animal behaviour. Interface Focus 2,
764–773. (doi:10.1098/rsfs.2012.0031)
41. Smith BH, Getz WM. 1994 Nonpheromonal olfactory
processing in insects. Annu. Rev. Entomol. 39, 351–
375. (doi:10.1146/annurev.en.39.010194.002031)
42. Perna A, Granovskiy B, Garnier S, Nicolis SC, Labe´dan
M, Theraulaz G, Fourcassie´ V, Sumpter DJ. 2012
Individual rules for trail pattern formation in
Argentine ants (Linepithema humile). PLoS Comput.
Biol. 8, e1002592. (doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002592)
43. Deco G, Scarano L, Soto-Faraco S. 2007 Weber’s law
in decision making: integrating behavioral data in
humans with a neurophysiological model.
J. Neurosci. 27, 11 192–11 200. (doi:10.1523/
JNEUROSCI.1072-07.2007)
44. Stevens SS. 1957 On the psychophysical law.
Psychol. Rev. 64, 153–181. (doi:10.1037/h0046162)
45. Johnson KO, Hsiao SS, Yoshioka T. 2002 Book
review: neural coding and the basic law of
psychophysics. Neurosci. 8, 111–121. (doi:10.1177/
107385840200800207)
46. Dehaene S. 2003 The neural basis of the Weber–
Fechner law: a logarithmic mental number line.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 7, 145–147. (doi:10.1016/S1364-
6613(03)00055-X)
47. Katz Y, Tunstrom K, Ioannou C, Huepe C, Couzin I. 2011
Inferring the structure and dynamics of interactions in
schooling fish. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 108, 18 720–
18 725. (doi:10.1073/pnas.1107583108)48. Herbert-Read J, Perna A, Mann R, Schaerf T,
Sumpter D, Ward A. 2011 Inferring the rules of
interaction of shoaling fish. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci.
USA 108, 18 726–18 731. (doi:10.1073/pnas.
1109355108)
49. Gautrais J, Ginelli F, Fournier R, Blanco S, Soria M,
Chate´ H, Theraulaz G. 2012 Deciphering interactions
in moving animal groups. PLoS Comput. Biol. 8,
e1002678. (doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002678)
50. Couzin ID, Krause J, Franks NR, Levin SA. 2005
Effective leadership and decision-making in animal
groups on the move. Nature 433, 513–516.
(doi:10.1038/nature03236)
51. Leonard NE, Shen T, Nabet B, Scardovi L, Couzin ID,
Levin SA. 2012 Decision versus compromise for
animal groups in motion. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA
109, 227–232. (doi:10.1073/pnas.1118318108)
52. Couzin I, Ioannou C, Demirel G, Gross T, Torney C,
Hartnett A, Conradt L, Levin S, Leonard N. 2011
Uninformed individuals promote democratic
consensus in animal groups. Science 334, 1578–
1580. (doi:10.1126/science.1210280)
53. Aplin LM, Farine DR, Mann RP, Sheldon BC. 2014
Individual-level personality influences social foraging
and collective behaviour in wild birds. Proc. R. Soc. B
281, 20141016. (doi:10.1098/rspb.2014.1016)
54. Ballerini M et al. 2008 Interaction ruling animal
collective behavior depends on topological rather
than metric distance: evidence from a field study.
Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 105, 1232–1237. (doi:10.
1073/pnas.0711437105)
55. Ballerini M, Cabibbo N, Candelier R, Cavagna A,
Cisbani E, Giardina I, Orlandi A, Parisi G, Procaccini A
. 2008 Empirical investigation of starling flocks: a
benchmark study in collective animal behaviour.
Anim. Behav. 76, 201–215. (doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.
2008.02.004)
56. Buhl J, Sumpter D, Couzin I, Hale J, Despland E,
Miller E, Simpson S. 2006 From disorder to order in
marching locusts. Science 312, 1402–1406. (doi:10.
1126/science.1125142)
